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Will the Real Elena Kagan Please Stand Up?
Conflicting Public Images in the Supreme Court Confirmation Process
Keith J. Bybee †
Forthcoming in Wake Forest Journal of Law & Policy, Spring 2011
ABSTRACT
What images of judging did the Kagan confirmation process project?
My response to this question begins with a brief overview of existing public
perceptions of the Supreme Court. I argue that a large portion of the public sees
the justices as impartial arbiters who can be trusted to rule fairly. At the same
time, a large portion of the public also sees the justices as political actors who
are wrapped up in partisan disputes. Given these prevailing public views, we
should expect the Kagan confirmation process to transmit contradictory images
of judicial decisionmaking, with a portrait of judging as a matter of reason and
principle vying for attention with a picture of judging as a political enterprise.
Second, I identify the different appearances of judicial action actually at play in
the Kagan confirmation process by assessing all confirmation-related news
articles, editorials, opinion pieces, and blog posts published in the Washington
Post, the New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times. I find that the
confirmation coverage in the three newspapers conveys a contradictory mix of
images that closely corresponds to the contradictory views of the Court already
held by large numbers of Americans.
Finally, I consider the significance of the Janus-faced public beliefs about the
Supreme Court. I acknowledge the ways in which political perceptions can chip
away at judicial legitimacy, but I also argue that the public’s competing views
may ultimately have a stable co-existence. If we believe that individuals
generally place contradictory demands on the courts, calling for an objectively
fair system and at the same time seeking a guarantee that their own side will
prevail, then a judiciary that appears at once to be governed by impartial
principle and by partisan preference may cohere.

†
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One of the lighter moments in the Supreme Court confirmation process
last summer occurred during the second day of hearings before the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Senator Arlen Specter asked the nominee Elena Kagan if
she thought Supreme Court oral arguments should be broadcast on television.
Kagan warmly supported the idea and she outlined the positive effects that
televised arguments would have on the public as well as on the Court itself.
Kagan then identified a final consequence of placing cameras before the high
bench: “It means that I would have to get my hair done more often, Senator
Specter.” 1
Kagan’s comment provided comic relief and (perhaps inadvertently)
pointed toward an important fact about the judicial process: appearances matter
a great deal for courts. 2 Scholars have frequently argued that public confidence
in the judiciary depends not only on the actual results of court rulings but also
the ability of judges to convey the impression that their decisions are driven by
the impersonal requirements of legal principle. 3 The public cares about how
judges look. The avoidance of actual judicial improprieties is necessary to secure
1

Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Why Kagan Supports Broadcasting Oral Arguments, NEW YORK TIMES (June
29, 2010, 3:56 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/why-kagan-supportsbroadcasting-court-arguments.
2

For an account of judicial appearances in the United States and an analysis of their
significance, see KEITH J. BYBEE, ALL JUDGES ARE POLITICAL—EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE NOT: ACCEPTABLE
HYPOCRISIES AND THE RULE OF LAW (2010). I draw on arguments from my book throughout this
article.
3

See generally James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Vanessa Baird, On the Legitimacy of
National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 343–58 (1998); Trevor L. Brown & Charles R.
Wise, Constitutional Courts and Legislative-Executive Relations: The Case of Ukraine, 119 POL.
SCI. Q. 143, 143-69 (2004).
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judicial legitimacy but it is not sufficient; judges must also visibly appear to play
the role of neutral arbiter in order to reduce the probability of actual bias and to
maintain popular support. 4
The importance of appearances has long been evident in the codes of
judicial conduct. As Charles Geyh has observed, the first Canons of Judicial
Ethics, created in 1924, paid significant attention to questions of appearance:
one canon declared directly,
that a judge’s official conduct should be ‘free from... the appearance of
impropriety,’ [while] eleven other canons cautioned judges to avoid
conduct that could create ‘suspicion’ of misbehavior or ‘misconceptions’ of
the judicial role that might ‘appear’ or ‘seem’ to interfere with judicial
duties, or that could ‘create the impression’ of bias. 5
The original concern for judicial appearances remains central to the modern
judicial conduct codes now established in all fifty states. 6 The same concern for
maintaining the propriety of judicial appearances can also be found in the federal
code. 7
The widely recognized importance of judicial appearances suggests two
questions: What images of the courts and judicial decisionmaking were
4

For evidence that the appearance of judicial bias reflects the presence of actual bias, see Chris
W. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, The Effect of Campaign Contributions on Judicial Decisionmaking
(Feb. 4, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337668.
5

Charles Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts in an Age of Individual Rights and
Public Skepticism, in BENCH PRESS: THE COLLISION OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA 21, 29 (Keith

J. Bybee ed., 2007).
6

Id. at 30-32.

7

See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2 (2009), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02A-Ch02.pdf
(last visited Nov. 29, 2010).
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conveyed by the Kagan confirmation process? What is the significance of these
images? Whether one thinks that the confirmation process is a good way of
identifying qualified nominees or is merely a “waste of everyone’s time,” 8 it is
undeniably true that Supreme Court confirmations offer a highly public display of
claims about how the Court works and what counts as a good justice. A day
may come when the Court’s oral arguments (and Justice Kagan’s hair) are a
staple of the television broadcast schedule. Until that day arrives, however, it is
fair to say that one of the most prominent public discussions of the Court
happens when a vacancy on the high bench is being filled. 9 If we are interested
in identifying and evaluating how the Court appears to the American people,
then the confirmation process – beginning with the hearings in the Senate
Judiciary Committee and ending with the full Senate’s confirmation vote – merits
careful study.
In this Article, I examine the images of judging generated by the Kagan
confirmation process. I develop my argument in three sections. In the first
section, I provide a brief overview of existing public perceptions of the Supreme
Court. I argue that a large portion of the public sees the justices as impartial
arbiters who can be trusted to rule fairly. At the same time, a large portion of
8

Ronald Dworkin, The Temptation of Elena Kagan, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (July 22,
2010), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/aug/19/temptation-elena-kagan.
9

Confirmation processes do not typically dominate the news, but they can draw significant
public attention, at least for a limited period. Polls conducted during the Kagan confirmation, for
example, showed about 40% of those surveyed were paying close attention to the process. See
Jennifer Agiesta, Majority to Back Kagan Confirmation as Interest Wanes, WASHINGTON POST (July
20, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/behind-thenumbers/2010/07/majority_back_kagan_confirmati.html.
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the public also sees the justices as political actors who are wrapped up in
partisan disputes. To the extent that the confirmation process is consistent with
prevailing public views, we should expect the process to transmit contradictory
images of judicial decisionmaking, with a portrait of judging as a matter of
reason and principle vying for attention with a picture of judging as a political
enterprise.
In the second section of the Article, I identify the different appearances of
judicial action at play in the Kagan confirmation process by assessing all
confirmation-related news articles, editorials, opinion pieces, and blog posts
published in the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Los Angeles

Times. I find that the confirmation coverage in the three newspapers conveys a
contradictory mix of images that closely corresponds to the contradictory views
of the Supreme Court already held by large numbers of Americans. Thus the
confirmation process seems to have reaffirmed and reinforced existing public
perceptions.
In the final section of the Article, I consider the significance of the Janusfaced public beliefs about the Supreme Court. One can certainly argue that the
political view of the Court will undermine the belief that the justices are impartial
arbiters, inexorably leading to the conclusion that members of the Court are
simply political agents hiding their partisan agenda under a cover of law. I
acknowledge the ways in which political perceptions can chip away at judicial
legitimacy, but I also argue that the public’s competing views may ultimately

4

have a stable co-existence. If we believe that individuals generally place
contradictory demands on the courts, calling for an objectively fair system and at
the same time seeking a guarantee that their own side will prevail, then a
judiciary that appears at once to be governed by impartial principle and by
partisan preference begins to make sense. This is by no means to say that such
a paradoxical system is equitable or just. But it may well be the system that best
suits our conflicting desires.

I. Public Views of the Supreme Court
The conventional understanding of judicial decisionmaking requires judges
to be shielded from politics and allowed to render decisions based on an
impartial reading of the law. 10 This does not mean, of course, that judges must
approach controversies without any pre-existing beliefs about what the law
requires. As a practical matter, judges inevitably come to the bench with some
preconceived legal views. The conventional expectation of judicial impartiality
does not ask judges to abandon their legal preconceptions, so much as it calls
upon them to not let preconceptions “harden into prejudgments,” preventing
them from giving fair weight to the facts, law, and arguments that will be
presented in the disputes before them. 11 The American Bar Association
10

See generally ABA Comm. on the 21st Century Judiciary, Informal Report, Justice in Jeopardy
(July 2003) [hereinafter Justice in Jeopardy], available at
http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2010).
11

Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 181, 211 (2004).

5

considers this ideal of judicial impartiality to be so broadly shared that it is an
“enduring principle.”
Judges occupy the role of umpires in an adversarial system of justice;
their credibility turns on their neutrality. To preserve their neutrality, they
must neither prejudge matters that come before them, nor harbor bias for
or against parties in those matters. They must, in short, be impartial, if
we are to be governed by the rule of law rather than by judicial whim. 12
Public opinion surveys suggest that most of the American public sees the
Supreme Court as living up to this conventional expectation of judicial
impartiality. Numerous studies demonstrate that the Court receives a significant
degree of public goodwill because it is generally thought to be an even-handed
guarantor of basic democratic values for all. 13 Polls show that 66% of Americans
trust the Court to operate in the best interests of the American people either “a
great deal” or “a fair amount,” and that 75% of the public either “agree or
strongly agree” that the Court can usually be trusted to make decisions that are
right for the country as a whole. 14 Moreover, the Court is, according to most
people, properly insulated from the machinations of the other branches of

12

Justice in Jeopardy, supra note 10, at 9.

13

See generally Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the
Supreme Court, 36 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 635, 635-64 (1992); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira &
Lester Kenyatta Spence, Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J.
OF POL. SCI. 354, 354–76 (2003) [hereinafter Gibson et al., Measuring Attitudes]; James L. Gibson,
The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a Polarized Polity, 4 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 507, 507-38 (2007) [hereinafter Gibson, Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court].
14

Judicial Survey Results, Annenberg Public Policy Center, Public Understanding of and Support

for the Courts 2007 (Oct. 17, 2007),

http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/20071017_JudicialSurvey/Judicial_Findi
ngs_10-17-2007.pdf.

6

government. When asked whether federal judges should be subject to greater
political control by elected officials, over two-thirds of those surveyed said no. 15
Yet, even though solid majorities believe that the Supreme Court makes
fair decisions and impartially advances general welfare, a large number of
Americans also believe that members of the Court are influenced by politics.
Some of the very same opinion studies that show broad belief in the Court’s
good offices also indicate a widely shared view that the Court operates with too
little regard for either legal principles or impartiality, with a near majority of
respondents agreeing that the Court is “too mixed up in politics.” 16 A majority
(62%) of the public agrees that judicial decisionmaking should not be affected at
all by whether a justice is a political liberal or a political conservative, but a
significant number of Americans (43%) also believes that political ideology
actually has a “large impact” on Court decisions. 17 Thus it is not surprising to
find that the public often rates the Court in partisan terms, routinely evaluating
Court performance from the perspective of individual party affiliation. 18 Positive

15

Poll: Americans Don’t Want Politicians Constraining Judges, CNN.COM (Oct. 28, 2006, 9:01
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/10/27/activist.judges.

16

See Gibson et al., Measuring Attitudes, supra note 13, at 358; see also Gibson, Legitimacy of
the U.S. Supreme Court, supra note 13, at 519. See also generally James L. Gibson, Gregory A.
Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing
Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POL. RES. Q. 187, 187-201 (2005); James
L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Supreme Court Nominations, Legitimacy Theory and the
American Public: A Dynamic Test of the Theory of Positivity Bias (July 4, 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=998283.
17

John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and Public Opinion: Popular Expectations
Regarding Factors That Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 POL. BEHAV. 181, 185 (2001).
18

Thirteen polls conducted by the Gallup Poll News Service from 2000 through 2007 show that
Americans’ overall ratings of the Court are clearly related to their party affiliation. See Gallup Poll
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opinions of the Court have been shown to fall among Democrats and
conservative Republicans when the former find leading decisions to be too
conservative and the latter find decisions not to be conservative enough. 19 And
when asked what sort of judge is most likely to let personal beliefs influence
legal decisions, 40% of those polled said liberal judges, 39% said conservative
ones, and 13% thought that both were equally likely to do so. 20 For many
members of the public, the overwhelming prevalence of conventional talk about
impartial and principled judicial decisionmaking does not prevent judging from
looking like a matter of politics, pure and simple.
In the final section of this Article, I will consider how the public’s
conflicting views of the Supreme Court – views that take the Court to be at once
an institution of impartial principle and an arena of political bias – can be said to
relate to one another. 21 As an initial matter, however, a general understanding
of public perceptions provides a useful basis for generating expectations about
the appearances of judging broadcast by the Kagan confirmation process.

News Service, Slim Majority of Americans Approve of the Supreme Court (Sept. 26, 2007),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/28798/Slim-Majority-Americans-Approve-Supreme-Court.aspx. For
polling data from 2005 through 2010 that also shows persistent partisan evaluation of the
Supreme Court, see Pew Research Center for People and the Press, Republicans Less Positive
Toward Supreme Court (July 9, 2010), http://people-press.org/report/632.
19

Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Supreme Court’s Image Declines as
Nomination Battles Loom (June 15, 2005), http://people-press.org/report/247/supreme-

courtsimage-declines-as-nomination-battle-looms.
20

Susan Page, What Americans Want in O’Connor Court Vacancy, USA TODAY (July 13, 2005,
11:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-07-13-court-cover_x.htm.
21

For the argument that public perceptions of both state judges and judges in general are
similarly split into contradictory camps, see Bybee, supra note 2, at 6-10, 16-18.

8

Thus to the degree that the confirmation process is consistent with
prevailing public beliefs, we should expect Senate hearings and debate to
generate contradictory images of Supreme Court justices as neutral arbiters and
as political actors. 22 On the one hand, we should anticipate that there will be
efforts to present the activity of judging as a matter of impartial principle,
reason, and restraint. The most extended articulation of this conventional ideal
of judging is most likely to come from the nominee herself. On the other hand,
we should also anticipate that confirmation process will appear to be a matter of
politicians and pressure groups competing to install ideological fellow travelers
on the bench. We should expect this second image of judging to be framed in
terms of the conventional ideals of endorsed by the nominee. That is, we can
expect that everyone involved in the process will decry the influence of politics
on the high bench. Senators will deny that they are applying any kind of
ideological litmus test and will insist that they are simply supporting judicial
nominees who will adhere to the law. And, yet, even as participants in the
confirmation process extol the standard judicial virtues, we should anticipate a
clear message indicating that most participants actually want something quite
different: rather than impartiality and open-mindedness, they seek a person
who will reliably advance issues of interest to important political constituencies.

22

Reasoning along these lines, I wrote a short article outlining expectations for the confirmation
process that was published as the Judiciary Committee hearings began. See Keith J. Bybee,
Kagan’s Confirmation: Conflicting Imagery, JURIST (June 28, 2010),
http://jurist.org/forum/2010/06/kagans-confirmation-conflicting-imagery.php. I draw from this
article in the above paragraph in the text.

9

II. Images of Judicial Action in the Confirmation Process
What images of judging did the Kagan confirmation process in fact
produce? In order to gain some leverage on this question, I examined all
confirmation-related news articles, editorials, opinion pieces, and blog posts
published in the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Los Angeles

Times from the start of the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on June 28,
2010, until the final Senate vote on August 5, 2010. The material from the three
newspapers was gathered using the built-in search functions at each paper’s
website. The name “Kagan” was selected as the basic search term because it
not only established outer limits on the search (the name is somewhat specific to
the confirmation process during the relevant time period), but also promised to
deliver a comprehensive set of items. Table 1 displays the search results, with
coverage categorized by type in order to give a sense of what the individual
newspapers published as well as to indicate the overall distribution of material.

10

Table 1: Newspaper Coverage of Kagan Confirmation Process, 6/28/10-8/5/10 23
Newspapers
Los Angeles Times
New York Times
Washington Post
Total

News Articles Blog Posts
19
22
41
82

15
44
57
116

Editorials &
Opinion
5
10
24
39

Total
39
76
122
237

As the table indicates, the Washington Post offered the greatest amount
of coverage, a result of the fact that the confirmation process was a “hometown”
event for the newspaper. The table also indicates that the greatest amount of
coverage overall came in the form of blog posts. The high number of such posts
reflects the ease of blogging and should not be considered a measure of
comprehensive reporting. Many blog posts were quite short: a number were
limited a single breaking development (such as a senator announcing how she
planned to vote on the confirmation) or to conveying a humorous aside. Other
blog posts were little more than a list of links to confirmation news articles to be
found in the day’s newspaper or elsewhere on the web. On the whole, the news
articles and opinion pieces tended to be substantially longer and more detailed
than the blog posts. 24
In analyzing the material, my goal was to identify the images of judging
projected by the entire confirmation coverage in the three newspapers. I did not

23

Compiled by Author.

24

The news articles and opinion pieces did, of course, significantly differ from one another in
tone and style.

11

suppose that any single reader would read all of the coverage offered by any one
outlet. Instead, I reasoned that the totality of material published by the
newspapers would be a fair sample of the complete universe of confirmation
coverage generated by all media. To learn how three large newspapers framed
the confirmation process for their readers is, I would argue, to gain a good
understanding how the media as a whole represented Kagan’s journey from
committee hearings to the final vote.
With the description of the newspaper material and of my research
rationale in mind, we can address a re-formulated version of the question with
which this section began: What images of judging were projected by the

Washington Post, New York Times, and Los Angeles Times coverage of the
Kagan confirmation process? 25
All three newspapers clearly conveyed the impression that judicial
decisionmaking is a matter of impartial principle, and did so primarily by
reporting the words of Kagan herself. A number of Kagan’s comments came
from the exchanges the nominee had with the Senators on the Judiciary
Committee, where she repeatedly insisted that judging is a modest activity
restricted to the impartial gauging of arguments and evidence in each case.

25

Please note that in the following discussion of the newspapers’ coverage I cite only some of
the published items that verify each of the claims I make in the text. I have opted for illustrative
article citation since exhaustive citation (for example, listing all the articles reproducing the same
quotation from Kagan) would greatly lengthen each footnote without good reason.

12

•

“As a judge, you are on nobody’s team. As a judge, you are an
independent actor.” 26

•

“I’m sure that everybody [on the Supreme Court] is acting in good
faith. You wouldn’t want the judicial process to become in any way
a bargaining process or a logrolling process. You wouldn’t want
people to trade with each other – you know, ‘You’ll vote this way
and I’ll vote that way, and then we can… get some unanimous
decisions.’” 27

•

“[Congress] ought to be the policymakers for the nation. The
courts have an important role to play, but it’s a limited role. It’s
essentially sort of policing the boundaries and making sure that
Congress doesn’t overstep its role, doesn’t violate individual rights
or interfere with other parts of the government system.” 28

26

Kagan Draws Mixed Reactions from Senate Judiciary Committee, LOS ANGELES TIMES (June 30,
2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/30/nation/la-na-kagan-hearing-react-20100701.

27

Robert Barnes & Amy Goldstein, Kagan Finished Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings,
WASHINGTON POST (July 1, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/06/30/AR2010063000369.html.
28

Adam Liptak, Kagan Reminds Senators: Legislation Is Your Job, NEW YORK TIMES (July 2,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/us/politics/02assess.html; see also Confirm Elena
Kagan, NEW YORK TIMES (June 30, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/01/opinion/01thu1.html; The Republicans and the
Constitution, NEW YORK TIMES (July 19, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/20/opinion/20tue1.html.
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•

“You shouldn’t want a judge who will tell you that she will reverse a
decision without listening to arguments and without reading the
briefs and without talking to colleagues.” 29

The image of judge as impartial arbiter was also evident in Kagan’s
opening statement to the Judiciary Committee, in which Kagan explained how
her experience in various settings taught her a set of lessons about the
neutrality, principle, reason, and restraint of the Court. On the basis of these
lessons, Kagan pledged, “to listen hard to every party before the Court and to
each of my colleagues . . . [to] work hard . . . [and to] do my best to consider
every case impartially, modestly, with commitment to principle, and in
accordance to law.” 30
The newspaper coverage also managed to communicate an ideal of
impartial judging when it was not directly reporting Kagan’s words. Some pieces
offered defenses of Kagan’s claims to impartiality and restraint, presenting the
nominee as charting a principled course throughout the Judiciary Committee
hearings. 31 Various editorials and opinion columns appealed to Kagan as a
29

James Oliphant, Kagan Slips on Fruits and Vegetables in Senate Panel Questioning, LOS
ANGELES TIMES (July 1, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/01/nation/la-na-kaganhearings-20100701.
30

Elena Kagan’s Opening Statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, LOS ANGELES TIMES (June
28, 2010, 3:38 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2010/06/elna-kagan-judiciarystatement-supreme-court.html; see also Michael Muskal, Supreme Court Nominee Elena Kagan
Vows to Work Impartially, LOS ANGELES TIMES (June 28, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/28/nation/la-na-elena-kagan-supreme-court-20100628.
31

See Robert Barnes, High Court Nominee’s Cautious Answers Frustrate Senators, WASHINGTON
POST (July 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/03/AR2010070302216.html; Confirm Elena Kagan, WASHINGTON POST
(July 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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person seriously committed to legal principle, and attempted to persuade her to
adopt one jurisprudential philosophy or another. 32 And still other articles zeroedin on Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, portraying his support of Kagan as an
indication that the confirmation process turned on the question of whether the
nominee had the knowledge, prudence, and temperament necessary for
impartial judgment. 33
The image of impartial judicial decisionmaking was not, however, the only
image to be found in the newspapers. Indeed, the image of the impartial jurist
was not even the most common vision of judging presented by the coverage.
The far more frequent rendering of judicial action centered on politics. For many
Republican senators, the clearest example of the political judge was Kagan
herself. From the outset, Republicans tended to “cast Kagan as an
inexperienced, progressive political operative who would work to preserve the
dyn/content/article/2010/07/03/AR2010070302694.html; E.J. Dionne, Jr., A Judicial Change to
Believe In, WASHINGTON POST (July 5, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2010/07/04/AR2010070403846.html.
32

Jeffrey Rosen, Brandeis’s Seat, Kagan’s Responsibility, NEW YORK TIMES (July 2, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/04/opinion/04rosen.html; Jonathan Rauch, A ‘Kagan Doctrine’
on Gay Marriage, NEW YORK TIMES (July 2, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/opinion/03rauch.html; Katrina Vanden Heuvel, Retiring
Chief Justice Roberts’s Umpire Analogy, WASHINGTON POST (June 28, 2010, 5:16 PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2010/06/retiring_chief_justice_roberts.html.
33

Dana Milbank, Lindsey Graham Stands Apart From Other Republican Senators on Kagan Vote,
WASHINGTON POST (July 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/20/AR2010072005445.html; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Panel
Backs Kagan Nomination, With One Republican Vote, NEW YORK TIMES (July 20, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/us/21kagan.html; David G. Savage, Elena Kagan Approved
by Senate Judiciary Committee in 13-6 Vote, LOS ANGELES TIMES (July 21, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/21/nation/la-na-kagan-vote-20100721. For a similar
approach that focuses on participants other than Graham, see Aaron Blake, Bush Administration
Lawyers Praise Kagan, WASHINGTON POST (July 1, 2010),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/07/bush-administration-lawyers-pr.html.

15

president’s policy agenda once on the high court rather than serve as an
objective jurist.” 34 For example, in announcing his decision to vote against
Kagan, Senator Orrin Hatch called her “a skilled political lawyer” and criticized
her for supporting jurists that Hatch considered to be activists. “The law must
control the judge; the judge must not control the law,” Hatch argued. 35 Senator
Jeff Sessions reached the same conclusion:
I believe she does not have the gifts and the qualities of mind or
temperament that one must have to be a justice…. [Kagan would be] an
activist, liberal progressive, politically minded judge who will not be happy
simply to decide cases but will seek to advance her causes under the
guise of judging. 36
Most Democratic senators countered Republican criticism of Kagan by
characterizing her as an exemplar of conventional judicial ideals (as Senator
Patrick Leahy put it, Kagan will “do her best to consider every case impartially,
modestly, and with commitment to principle and in accordance with law.” 37).
Democrats then re-focused the deflected criticism of political judging onto the
conservative justices sitting on the Supreme Court. “The rightward shift of the
Court under Chief Justice Roberts is palpable,” Senator Chuck Schumer argued.

34

James Oliphant, Senate Begins Debate Over Supreme Court Nominee Kagan, LOS ANGELES
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Oliphant, Senate Begins Debate],
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/03/nation/la-na-kagan-nomination-20100804.
35

Bernie Becker, Hatch Opposes Kagan, NEW YORK TIMES (July 2, 2010, 11:35 AM),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/hatch-opposes-kagan.
36

David M. Herszenhorn, In Senate, Vote Nears on Kagan Nomination, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 4,
2010),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9501EFD8173FF937A3575BC0A9669D8B63.

37

Oliphant, Senate Begins Debate, supra note 33.
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“In decision after decision, special interests are winning out over ordinary
citizens. In decision after decision, this Court bends the law to suit an
ideology.” 38
The dueling Republican and Democratic assertions about the identity of
the real political judges might simply be read as evidence of bipartisan support
for the conventional ideal of impartial judicial decisionmaking. After all, neither
party invoked the idea of “political judging” as a form of praise and all senators
describe their ideal member of the Court in conventional language of impartiality
and principle. The newspaper coverage argues against such a reading, however,
by repeatedly suggesting that few of the senators really placed much stock in the
conventional ideals they espoused. Throughout the Judiciary Committee hearing
“both sides prevailed upon Kagan to be the very thing that both sides say they
decry: a nominee with preformed views about the law.” 39 The newspapers
consistently presented the Senators as being locked in a political battle whose
lines had been drawn by the looming midterm elections. 40 In this context,
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senatorial exchanges were not a part of joint deliberations so much as they were
efforts to score political points and placate key partisan constituencies. 41
The political competition that galvanized the Senators diminished Kagan,
pushing to her to the margins of a confirmation process that was ostensibly
designed to focus on her. 42 The intense political competition also cast doubt on
Kagan’s own professions of principle and impartiality. Just as the senators were
understood to be manipulating the process in order to promote political
objectives on the bench and at the polls, Kagan was understood to be using the
process to advance her own interest in getting confirmed. She was repeatedly
portrayed as carefully following a “script” that dictated her every gesture and
comment. 43 Her participation was simply an act, a show designed to secure her
elevation to the high bench without revealing anything about the person on
stage. The senators seemed to recognize that Kagan’s heavily coached remarks
41
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resembled the artificial, highly orchestrated statements that elected official
themselves often make (“This is,” Senator Durbin observed, “an art form we
have developed.” 44). And yet senators of both parties also condemned the fact
of Kagan’s performance as “a game of ‘hide the ball’.” 45 No one appeared to like
evasion and pretense, including those whom acknowledged their dependence on
these very devices.

III. The Significance of Contradictory Images
How should the Kagan confirmation process’s contradictory images of
judging – images that map onto the conflicting perceptions that Americans
generally have of the Supreme Court – be understood?
Perhaps the most straightforward way to answer this question is to say
that the public’s inconsistent views threaten judicial legitimacy. As a leading
scholar writes, “[t]he more that the public and their representatives think that
judges generally – not just a particular judge or panel of judges in isolated cases
– follow their political leanings instead of the law, the more likely it becomes that
long-established [judicial] independence norms will be challenged with increasing
intensity and will ultimately yield to calls for greater judicial accountability from
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Congress.” 46 With a large segment of the public dubious about the impartiality
of the courts’ decisions, it seems that the judiciary’s standing as an independent,
authoritative arbiter of disputes is in danger, raising the specter of a coming age
“where political officials tell judges how to decide cases.” 47 Indeed, some
commentators believe that we are already at the threshold of “a war of all
against all within and through the law.” 48 Without a rock-solid belief that the
judiciary is limited by impartial principle, law will soon be “little more than the
spoils that go to winners in contests among private interests who, by their
victory, secure the prize of enlisting the coercive power of the legal apparatus to
enforce their agenda.” 49 Those who end up on the losing side of this bleak
system will comply only because of fear of punishment and “out of the hope that
they might prevail in future contests to take their turn to wield the law.” 50
The newspaper coverage of the Kagan confirmation process explicitly
raised this prospect of a significantly delegitimized judiciary. After Kagan was
confirmed by the Senate, Curt Levy of the Committee for Justice, a group that
opposed confirmation, argued that political perceptions would continue to haunt
Kagan on the bench: “The confirmation process inevitably resulted in Kagan
46
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losing some legitimacy in the eyes of the public . . . [and that] will make
Americans more skeptical of any controversial decisions she’s a part of.” 51 In a
similar spirit, Senator Amy Klobuchar openly worried that the sharp partisanship
that marked the confirmation would substantially undermine “the people’s faith
in the Court” as an independent and impartial body. 52
Yet the newspaper coverage also contained some indications that the
demise of judicial legitimacy was far from certain. Although the confirmation
process appeared to be a highly partisan affair with a belief in the political nature
judging at its core, it is still the case that Americans consider the Supreme Court
to be an impartial arbiter. As Douglas Kendall observed, in the same news article
where Levy and Klobuchar predicted the judiciary’s demise, “[Democratic
senators] tried the same general strategy with the Alito nomination with a
stronger case, higher stakes, and more media focus, and I don’t think very many
Americans now view Alito to be an illegitimate justice.” 53
Opinion surveys similarly suggest that the politics of confirmation do not
necessarily impugn the public’s perception of Court’s character. As I noted
earlier, a substantial plurality of Americans believes that political ideology infects
Supreme Court decisionmaking even as a large majority of the public insists that
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political commitments ought to have no impact on the justices at all. 54 The
remarkable fact, however, is that the large gap between the expectation of
political neutrality and the acknowledgement of political influence does not have
a significant negative effect on overall evaluations of the Court. 55 The perception
that justices may not actually operate according to the conventional dictates of
impartiality does not seem to threaten public confidence in the Court after all.
How can this be? 56 By way of conclusion, let me suggest how we can
begin to think about a stable co-existence between appearances of impartial
judgment and politically influenced decisionmaking.
If we believe that people rely on the judicial process strictly as a source of
principled and impartial adjudication, then the perception that judges may
operate on the basis of partisan preference can only be corrosive. Yet if we
think that individuals not only may seek principled and impartial judgment, but
also may wish merely to drape themselves in the mantle of principled
impartiality, then a process beset by conflicting public beliefs makes a degree of
sense. The suspicion that judges might not conform to the conventional
understanding of objective reasoning and fair judgment will still eat away public
confidence. At the same time, the suspicion of political judgment will also attract
all those whom wish to merely dress up their preferences in the formal language
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of law in the hope that this will allow their cause to look better than it actually is.
Viewed from this perspective, law is a body of tests and procedures that
asks individuals to seek impartial standards of judgment outside their own will
while also creating an arena for the pursuit of personal interests and political
attachments. Such an arrangement may rightly be criticized for appearing
unfair, unreasonable, and inconsistent. But it is also an arrangement that may
endure because it conforms to the contradictory desires of people who at once
wish to have an neutral system of dispute resolution and want to ensure that
their preferred side wins.
Given this jumble of principle, politics, and posturing, it is no wonder that
the Supreme Court confirmation process fails to coalesce around a single image
of what judicial decisionmaking really is.
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